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On Nov. 3, Venezuelans went to the polls to elect 22 governors, 370 deputies, 330 mayors, and 2,404
district and municipal councilors from among more than 200,000 candidates. The few voters who
turned out moved Venezuela back to its traditional two-party system, while slow and disputed
results touched off riots in several states. The elections were a defeat for President Rafael Caldera,
who took office in 1994 in the midst of the worst economic crisis in Venezuela's history, and from
which it has still not emerged.
Despite harsh economic measures imposed by Caldera during the first year of his administration,
he was able to maintain a high level of popularity. However, as the economic crisis has continued,
Caldera's popularity has slipped, with his approval rating falling from 72% when he took
office to 39% in the most-recent polls. The general mood at the time of the elections was one of
disillusionment because of the persistent economic downturn that has brought a sharp reduction
in living standards. In fact, the collapse of Venezuela's private banking sector in early 1994 one
of the worst financial debacles in recent Latin American history continues to plague the Caldera
government, greatly aggravating the country's economic and political crisis.
Shortly after Caldera took office, 17 major banks failed as part of a financial scandal that wiped out
hundreds of millions of dollars in savings. Nearly two years later, Venezuela's economy is still in
shambles. With deepening recession, runaway inflation, and growing unemployment, the country
is light years away from the oil bonanza of the 1970s, when a surge in world crude prices helped it
enjoy the highest per capita income on the continent. The national currency, the bolivar, is currently
trading at about 330 per US$1.00, considerably lower than the official exchange rate of 170 bolivares
per US$1.00. Last year annual inflation climbed to 50% and Venezuela's hard currency reserves
plunged from US$12 billion to US$9 billion as the state continued to foot the bill for an exchange
rate control mechanism in effect since June 1994.
The latest economic forecast warns of even higher inflation for 1996, as well as growing
unemployment, which now stands officially at 12%, with an additional 50% trying to earn a living
in the informal economic sector. In addition, Caldera is about to undertake negotiations with the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a new loan, which is expected to bring with it more stringent
structural adjustment policies. Just before the elections, Planning Minister Edgar Paredes Pisani
announced that the government had struck an accord in principle with the IMF to devalue the
currency, which could significantly aggravate inflation. In the Dec. 3 elections, the principal political
forces in Venezuela were all trying to ignite some enthusiasm among Venezuelan voters.
For 35 of Venezuela's 37-year democracy, the social democrat Accion Democratico (AD) and the
Christian democrat COPEI (Comite de Organizacion Politica Electoral Independiente) controlled
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the political scene. Although both COPEI and the AD won eight governorships in 1992, they both
lost heavily in the general elections in 1993. The result was a four-way power division in Congress.
In addition to the AD and COPEI congressional blocs, Caldera formed a congressional alliance
between his own Convergencia Nacional party and the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). The Causa
R party makes up the fourth legislative power bloc. Both the AD and COPEI have benefitted from
the erosion of the Caldera administration's popularity. At the same time, Causa R has failed to
develop into a viable political party, despite its impressive victories in the 1994 general elections,
when it took 22% of the vote.
On election day, with more than 70,000 Venezuelan troops patrolling to ensure order, the AD was
the big winner, taking 11 of the country's 22 governorships. According to unofficial projections,
COPEI and MAS both took four governorships, Convergencia only won in one governor's race, and
two others are still unclear. Unofficial returns also showed the AD winning about 55% of the 330
mayoral posts at stake, including the capital of Caracas, home to more than a quarter of Venezuela's
21 million people. "The AD has regained its role as the people's party," said AD Chamber of
Deputies speaker Carmen Lauria.
However, analysts point out that the AD's victories were mostly in small ranching states, and
it was defeated in four of the six states with the largest populations and greatest development.
The AD's Antonio Ledezma won the important Caracas Federal District mayoral race, defeating
incumbent Causa R mayor Aristobulo Isturiz, who conceded the race the day after the elections.
Ledezma, however, will face an extremely difficult situation once he takes office given the
increasingly chaotic conditions in Caracas. According to a study by the Instituto de Urbanismo of
the Universidad Central de Venezuela, 69% of the people in Caracas live in shantytowns that are
perched precariously on steep hillsides and which are frequently devastated by landslides.
Of the slum dwellers, 78.5% had monthly incomes of less than US$400 in 1992, and barely 3.3%
earned more than US$705 per month. Caracas has been unable to respond to the growing problems
of violence and street crime or to the rapidly deteriorating infrastructure the issues ranked most
important by the population. In addition, the city is plagued by inadequate water supplies and
deteriorating health and education services. Meanwhile, following the elections, the slowness in
giving any official results touched off rioting in several states.
On Dec. 7, the National Guard was still protecting the electoral council (Consejo Supremo Electoral,
CSE) offices in Caracas and riot police and military were patrolling in several cities, including
Barquisimeto and Maracaibo. Causa R charged fraud after provincial electoral councils declared
AD candidates the winners in the states of Bolivar and Anzoategui. The situation in Bolivar was
especially tense, since it is the birthplace of Causa R and the center of its strength. Causa R Deputy
Carlos Melo said the party would not turn over the mayor's office in Caracas until the victories
in Bolivar, Anzoategui, and Zulia are recognized. Disturbances continued in Maracaibo, the port
capital of Zulia, where both former coup d'etat leader Arias Cardenas of Causa R and the AD
candidate, Omar Barboza, claimed victory. The slowness in announcing a winner also precipitated
riots and the militarization of Barquisimeto, the capital of the state of Lara. The contest for governor
was between Luis Jose Oropeza, running under an AD-COPEI alliance, and Orlando Fernandez, for
Convergencia/MAS.
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Finally, on Dec. 5, Oropeza conceded defeat. Political analysts said the high abstentionism officially
recognized at between 55% and 58% nationally and more than 60% in Caracas favored traditional
political powerhouses such as AD. The painful economic crisis and the lack of credibility by the
political parties or their leaders were determining factors in keeping most Venezuelans at home
on election day, according to the vice president of the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE), Rafael
Lander. Given that the abstention rate in these elections was the highest in Venezuela's history,
doubts are growing about the legitimacy of those elected. This was particularly true in Caracas,
where Ledezma, a presidential hopeful for 1998, won with only 20% of Caraquenos bothering to
vote, according to unofficial reports. "Under such conditions, the people do not feel represented
and the politicians do not feel responsible," said Carlos Blanco, former president of the state reform
commission (Comision para la Reforma del Estado, COPRE).
Former president Carlos Andres Perez said the AD victory will not be enough to satisfy the desire
for democracy. "The 'adecos' (members of the AD) gave the AD a victory, but Venezuelans showed
through abstentionism their discontent with the political parties," said Perez. Added former
President Luis Herrera Campins of COPEI, "It's a return to the traditional two-party system and a
political defeat for the government." Most analysts agree that the election results meant a return to
the two-party system. The governing Convergencia hoped to come out of the elections with a solid
base of support as an emerging political force. However, it only took one governorship. In the new
political map, Convergencia will be in fourth or fifth place behind AD, COPEI, MAS, and Causa R.
The new balance of power could see AD withdrawing the support it has given the government
and siding more with the opposition COPEI and Causa R, further debilitating the Caldera
administration. Venezuela's renown author, Arturo Uslar Pietri, said on election day, "We go home
after voting and realize that the elections are not going to solve the immense problems that we
have, because they can't. The country is confused politically, without clear options, without defined
political alternatives that correspond to reality. Most of the population looks at the political game
as something foreign to their lives." [Sources: Inter Press Service, 11/29/95, 12/03/95, 12/04/95;
Notimex, 12/04/95; Reuter, 12/01/95, 12/03-05/95; La Jornada (Mexico), 12/05/95; Agence FrancePresse, 11/29/95, 11/30/95, 12/03-05/95, 12/07/95]
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